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**ROUTING SLIP**

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Remarks

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*D/* Executive Secretary  
30 Jun 88  
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2627 (10-81)

Central Intelligence Agency

ER 4594A-88



Washington, D.C. 20505

June 30, 1988

Mr. Philip V. Fellman  
Cornell University  
Department of Government  
McGraw Hall  
Ithaca, New York 14853

Dear Mr. Fellman:

Thank you for your letter of 16 June seeking advice and assistance with respect to your doctoral dissertation, Critical Dimensions in Intelligence Policy 1974-1980.

STAT We can be of some assistance to you. Our Coordinator for Academic Affairs, [redacted] would be pleased to meet and talk with you and suggest a variety of publicly available sources that would get you started on your research. At some future point, we could revisit the issue of access to Agency material if you can make a stronger case for access. You would have to be quite specific about what you want, and the material would have to be at least ten years old for us even to consider declassification, according to regulations and law.


We consider growing academic interest in intelligence and its role in national security affairs to be a salutary development, although researchers such as yourself will always be hampered by the lack of ready access to primary materials.

STAT We wish you the best in your research. You may reach [redacted] STAT

STAT Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



P-311-15

27 June 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM: Coordinator for Academic Affairs, PAO

You asked me to review a PhD dissertation proposal by Philip V. Fellman of Cornell University. Mr. Fellman wants the Agency's assistance in investigating aspects of Intelligence Policy, including relations between the White House, the CIA and the Congress, during the period 1974-80. He asks for help because he says he wants his work to reflect favorably on the Agency.

I see no reason, at least based on the material Mr. Fellman has submitted, why he needs internal Agency data to investigate the issues he has in mind. A great deal of material is available on the public record. If, after digging into it, he makes a more cogent case for access, perhaps we might reconsider. He also must think about the effects in academic circles of having his thesis supported by the CIA.

I think Mr. Fellman has some interesting notions, although he seems to have concluded already that intelligence policy in the period 1974-80 hurt the Community and national security--a conclusion that is certainly open to some debate. Nevertheless, I would be happy to meet and talk with Mr. Fellman. I could suggest a variety of unclassified sources that would get him started on his research, and then we could revisit the issue if he can make a stronger case for access to our data. I think he would have to be quite specific about what he wanted, although it would have to be at least ten years old, according to present rules.

Coordinator for Academic Affairs

STAT

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET****SUBJECT:** (Optional)

Review of PhD Dissertation Proposal by Philip V. Fellman - Cornell Univ.

**FROM:**Coordinator for Academic Affairs  
Public Affairs Office**EXTENSION****NO.**

ER 2592X/1-88

**DATE**

27 June 1988

**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)**DATE****RECEIVED****FORWARDED****OFFICER'S INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

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**ROUTING SLIP**

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Remarks To # 14: Please provide comments to DDCI.

STAT

Executive Secretary

23 Jun 88

Date



## Cornell University

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT  
MCGRAW HALL  
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14853

Philip V. Fellman

Mr. Robert M. Gates  
Deputy Director,  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Executive Office  
Washington D.C. 20505

*Public Affairs  
Academic Committee  
Heaton*

June 16, 1988

Dear Mr. Gates:

I am writing you in order to request your advice and assistance in regard to my doctoral dissertation at Cornell University, Critical Dimensions in Intelligence Policy 1974-1980. In brief, I would like the results of my analysis to reflect as favorably as possible on the Agency. In particular, I would like to add empirical, documented, factual material to the academic debate which would both undermine the arguments of the Agency's critics, and support the general thesis which I argue: that in the heat of electoral mood politics and hostile media disclosures, several intelligence "reforms" worked counter to the national interest.

In order to support this claim, and in order to relate it to the broader issues of constituency and consensus which are crucial to the academic aspects of the thesis, I believe that I would require substantial help from the Agency, both in terms of access to archival material as well as direction in regard to which materials are relevant. I would, of course, be willing to



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
Philip V. Fellman

sign any necessary non-disclosure or prior-review agreements which the Agency deems necessary to protect proprietary information and information judged to be of significant national security interest.

In order to assist you in evaluating my request, I have enclosed three documents with this letter: (1) a copy of my thesis prospectus; (2) a brief resume; and (3) a recent paper which I prepared on the Soviet acquisition of Western technologies. I will be away from the department (and probably at the San Francisco address listed on my resume) for most of the Summer, but will return to Cornell in late August. I can be reached by phone at any time on my message service (also listed on the resume) or, when I am in San Francisco, on the direct line

STAT  I look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Philip V. Fellman". The signature is written in dark ink and is followed by a long horizontal line.

Philip V. Fellman

STAT

Philip V. Fellman



### EDUCATION

Cornell University, Ithaca, NY  
Ph.D. International Relations (expected S '89)  
M.A. International Relations, 1988  
M.A. Philosophy of Education, 1979

Yale School of Organization and Management, New Haven, CT  
M.P.P.M. (Masters in Public and Private Management), 1986

California Institute of the Arts, Valencia, CA  
B.F.A., Music, 1974

University of California, Los Angeles, CA  
Studies in physics and music 1969-73

### EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE

During the past four years, while completing advanced degrees in business and international relations, I have been engaged in a part-time consulting partnership. My principal partnership responsibilities involve interfacing between clients and the international legal and financial communities. My clients include Yanmar Diesel Corporation, Warner Communications, American Express, Dart Industries, and Continental Grain.

Chevron, Inc. (Standard Oil of California), President's Staff, San Francisco, CA, 1980-84. International Oil Traffic Specialist. Managed Chevron's 50% interest in the transportation of crude oil and refined products for Caltex Petroleum, Inc. (a joint subsidiary of Chevron and Texaco). Supervised preparation of quarterly, annual and five year logistics and transportation forecasts. Performed analytical review of marine provisions of Chevron's supply and transportation contracts. Arranged worldwide clearance of third-party crude and product supply vessels. Analyzed short term crude and product exchange economics. Negotiated tonnage exchanges and crude swaps between Chevron and British Petroleum, Texaco, Mobil, Shell, and Exxon. Served as Vice-Chairman, 1982-83 United Way campaign. Served as instructor, Chevron Shipping, management seminar in negotiation.

Philip V. Fellman

EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE (Cont'd.)

(1974-78) Traded options on the C.B.O.E. with Cantor, Fitzgerald, Inc. Managed small venture capital projects. Worked as an independent consultant to a variety of business enterprises (primarily precious metals and entertainment related tax shelters).

PUBLICATIONS

1. Theodore Marmor with the Assistance of Philip Fellman:

"Policy Entrepreneurship in Government: An American Study", Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 225-253, Cambridge University Press, (London 1987)

"Entrepreneurship in Public Management: Wilbur Cohen and Robert Ball" in Leadership and Innovation, ed. Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove, Johns Hopkins University Press, (Baltimore and London 1987)

"Entrepreneurship in Public Management", Working Papers, Series E, No. 3, Yale School of Organization and Management, (New Haven 1986)

2. Philip V. Fellman. "Some Aspects of the Capacity for Developed Preferences", Philosophy of Education 1980, ed. C.J.B. MacMillan, University of Illinois Press, (Urbana 1981). Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society.
3. Philip V. Fellman, "Constructing a Philosophical Paradigm for Music Education", Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 14, No. 3, (Urbana, 1980).
4. Editorial contributions to Value Development, Ed., Brian P. Hall, Paulist Press, (Chicago 1981); and "Self-Managed Professional Development", Report of the New York State Community College Staff Development Program, ed. John Dyopera, (Albany 1980).

Philip V. Fellman

WORKING PAPERS

1. "Japanese Imperial Expansion, 1931-41", Paper prepared for the Yale Seminar in Economics and International Conflict, 1986
2. "Congressional Decisionmaking and the Soviet Acquisition of Western Technologies", Paper submitted to the International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, 1988
3. "Practical Counter-Intelligence", paper presented at the Yale College Seminar on the governance and control of security institutions, 1986
4. "Intelligence and Foreign Policy", formal pre-doctoral research paper, Department of Government, Cornell University, 1987
5. "Strategic Marketing and the Next Generation of Counter-Intelligence" unpublished manuscript, Cornell University, 1988

FELLOWSHIPS AND PRIZES

1. 1986-87 Cornell University Graduate Fellowship
2. 1985-86 Yale School of Organization and Management Fellowship
3. 1984-85 Yale School of Organization and Management Fellowship
4. 1979-80 California State Graduate Fellowship
5. 1978-79 Cornell University Graduate Fellowship
6. 1973-74 California State Scholarship
7. 1972-73 Atwater Kent Prize (U.C.L.A.)
8. 1971-72 Clifton Webb Prize (U.C.L.A.)

REFERENCES

Paul Bracken, Professor of International Management, Yale School of Organization and Management, New Haven CT 06520  
(203) 432-9562; Consultant, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA  
(213) 393-0411.

Lawrence Scheinman, Professor of International Relations,  
Department of Government, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853  
(607) 255-8912

David M. Darst, Vice President, International Division, Goldman,  
Sachs, 85 Broad Street, New York, NY 10004 (212) 902-1000

Charles G. Lambert, Staff Counsel, President's Staff, Chevron  
Shipping Company, 555 Market Street, San Francisco, 94105  
(415) 894-5265

CRITICAL DIMENSIONS IN INTELLIGENCE POLICY 1974-1980

Ph.D. Thesis Prospectus  
Philip V. Fellman  
Cornell University  
June, 1988

American intelligence policy is in many ways a subset of the general category of public policy. However, there are a number of unique factors which not only differentiate intelligence policy from domestic public policy areas (such as health policy, agricultural policy or highway policy) but which also differentiate it from other types of foreign policy as well. During the period 1974-1980, American intelligence policy underwent several critical changes. In this thesis, I will examine these changes in terms of three kinds of factors (1) underlying structural variables; (2) intervening variables, or proximate causes; and (3) substantive policy outcomes as measured by changes in program functions, manpower levels, budgetary authorizations, organizational structure, and certain other relevant resource allocations and distributions within the Central Intelligence Agency.

The underlying structural variables which I focus upon are the American weak party system, and changing Presidential and Congressional needs for intelligence information and activities. With regard to the American weak party system, I am primarily concerned with the local district selection of Congressional candidates, and the concurrent need for candidates to provide visible electoral benefits to a distinct geographic constituency over a short time horizon. This process has been an important determinant of intelligence policy throughout the history of the CIA. However, it has produced several different types of results

depending upon the number and kind of intervening variables present.

Large scale Congressional involvement in the intelligence policy process began in 1974, with the Hughes-Ryan amendment, and soon led to a new kind of relationship in which Congress would become increasingly involved with the intelligence community. In the earlier period (1946-73), intelligence activities provided little in the way of visible electoral benefits, and therefore commanded little Congressional attention.<sup>1</sup> In the wake of Watergate, the mood politics of government scandal made the Church and Pike committee CIA hearings a prime vehicle for electioneering and publicity generation. However, the oversight committees which inherited the processes begun by the investigative committees also inherited the budgetary responsibility for the intelligence community (which had previously been handled on a rather informal basis by a very few, powerful committee chairmen).

Now that intelligence community budgeting was no longer a matter of quick, informal resolution, Congresspeople found themselves involved in mastering the difficult mechanics of zero based budgeting, program elements, decision units, and overlapping areas of program authority and finance (the Defense Department's Intelligence Related Activities alone comprised a

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<sup>1</sup> William Keller, in his book The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover (forthcoming, Princeton University Press) argues that domestic intelligence issues were forced off the Congressional agenda in the 1950's, because liberals felt these issues could only have a negative electoral impact.

multi-billion dollar budget and had significant overlaps with the CIA and NSA technical budgets). Moreover, budgetary review had to be carried out in three simultaneous time-frames: review of the prior year's budget, appropriation of current year funding, and planning the next year's budget. The information which the CIA provided to Congress in 1976, for budgets alone was probably significantly greater than all the information transmitted between the Agency and Congress during the entire 1946-73 period. Congressional tasking of the intelligence community remains an important dimension of this relationship, and in 1986, the CIA was still supplying Congress with more than 5,000 reports annually.<sup>2</sup> Naturally, this information flow played a significant (although generally overlooked) role in the changing relationship between the CIA and the Congress.

At the same time, (1974-80) Presidential intelligence requirements were also undergoing significant changes. Some of these differences in Presidential needs were due to changes in party and administration. Later, however, external events, as well as a change in Presidential perception regarding the role of intelligence agencies in foreign policy seem to have been more important influences on Presidential demands for intelligence information and activities. Sometimes this pressure of events and difference in perception also placed the President and Congressional majority (even though they were of the same party)

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<sup>2</sup> Robert M. Gates, "The CIA and American Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 2, Council on Foreign Relations, (New York: Winter 1987-88) p. 224.



substantially at odds. One method which I will use in this thesis to examine the effects of changing Presidential and Congressional demands for intelligence information and activities during the period is to compare their respective efforts at governance and control of the intelligence community. Examples of this activity are their investigative efforts (the Rockefeller Commission vs. the Church and Pike Committees) , their regulatory methods (particularly the use of Executive Order vs. charter legislation), and their liaison, coordination and tasking methods. In particular, I hope to provide some useful analysis on the changes in program content, budgetary authorization, and the shift in external constituency from the White House to Capitol Hill between 1974 and 1980.

Two sets of proximate causes are important during this period. The first set relates to what might be generally termed "disclosure activities", and consists of the effects of (1) Watergate, (2) the "resurgence" of Congress as exemplified by the War Powers Act of 1973 and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, and (3) various hostile media disclosures and exposes, including the two New York Times articles which revealed the CIA's attempted destabilization of the Allende regime<sup>3</sup>, and the contents of the internal compilation of the CIA's potential violations of its 1947 charter ("The Skeletons" or "The Family Jewels"), as well as hostile books by

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<sup>3</sup> Which led to the 1974, Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was the first, and largest Congressional effort at oversight of intelligence activities.

former CIA officers Victor Marchetti ("The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence") and Philip Agee ("Inside the Company").

The second group of proximate causes consists of the intelligence failures resulting from the loss of capabilities incurred through the earlier "reforms", particularly the program cuts implemented through the Zero Based Budgeting Decision Unit classification system begun in 1977. The disastrous foreign policy consequences of weakening the operational capabilities of the CIA ultimately led to both the functional repeal of Hughes-Ryan and the abandonment of the comprehensive legislative charter (via the Section 501 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947). Among the foreign policy failures which were in some way linked to the weakening of U.S. intelligence capabilities, I include the fall of the Shah of Iran, his subsequent replacement by the hostile regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini, the capture of the U.S. embassy in Teheran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Although a number of the subsequent relaxations in the stringency of the criteria for intelligence operations, as well as operational staff increases had to wait for the Reagan administration and Executive Orders 12333 and 12334, the future direction of intelligence policy was largely settled by 1980. In particular, just as the Congress and CIA settled into an early and long-lasting stable relationship in the 1946-73 period, the restructuring of this relationship also occurred quite rapidly and has remained rather stable.

Hughes-Ryan, for example, actually proved excessive in its oversight provisions, and was subsequently amended by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 (the Section 501 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947). Executive order 12036, while originally intended to serve as an interim model for a legislative charter of CIA and the remainder of the intelligence community, proved adequate for governance and control without a charter. Moreover, as Congress became engaged in the budgetary process,<sup>4</sup> the electoral benefits of mood politics receded and a certain dis-incentive toward charter and investigative activities emerged. In some ways this was a replication of the earlier pattern of Congress avoiding areas of policy which had no explicit return associated with them.

Moreover, Congressional control of budgetary appropriations and authorizations allowed Congress in virtually all cases to have the last word on the foreign policy uses of intelligence activities (evidenced by the Boland Amendments, particularly Boland II, which was appended to the FY 1984 Defense Authorization). This shift in the three-way relationship between the Presidency, Congress and the CIA, was so significant, that during the Reagan administration, several officials, including DCI William Casey, expressed frustration over the inability to

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<sup>4</sup> Which was where the bulk of visible electoral benefits to local constituencies would be found...primarily in the contracts (and associated jobs) pertaining to the IRA (Intelligence Related Activities) budget.

use the CIA as the personal covert action arm of the Presidency.<sup>5</sup> The Iran-Contra Affair Report describes the executive branch response, noting that "the NSC staff was enlisted to provide assistance in covert operations that the CIA could not or would not furnish."<sup>6</sup>

One important conclusion which the Iran-Contra Affair leads to is that Congress did not need a legislative charter in order to obtain a relatively strong degree of control over the CIA. Moreover, the existing system of governance by Executive Order, while constraining the CIA to the President's policy perspective, does not deprive Congresspersons of whatever electoral benefits they may derive from the existing Congressional budgetary governance of the CIA. While proximate causes may shift the allocation of resources (budgets, programs, manpower, organization, etc.) within the intelligence community in one direction or another, it appears that the underlying structural characteristics of American politics nonetheless determine the long-term equilibrium state of intelligence policy. By examining critical intelligence policy changes during the 1974-80 period, this thesis attempts to demonstrate the detailed ways in which underlying political structure has influenced policy outcomes.

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<sup>5</sup> The Iran-Contra Affair, U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington 1988), Chapter One (esp. pp. 13 ff.)

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONMAKING AND THE SOVIET  
ACQUISITION OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGIES

Philip V. Fellman  
Cornell University  
June, 1988

One of the most serious problems in American defense management is the prevention of the loss of sensitive military and military related technologies. The problems of this field are complex, as it is not simply the loss of a given component or a given technological process which may weaken the nation's defense in some easily quantifiable way. Frequently, clandestine Soviet acquisitions which would have a relatively low dollar value attached to them, reduce production lead time or production bottlenecks by a factor of years, which is the functional equivalent of billions of dollars in defense expenditures. The primary legal safeguard against the piracy of Western technology has been the export controls and administrative rules developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce under the Export Administration Act of 1979. While not perfect, the controls imposed under the Export Administration Act, have been generally effective in restricting Soviet access to sensitive Western technologies. The following brief paper examines some of the ways in which the American political system may contain inherent vulnerabilities which would eventually lead to the relaxation of current standards and an unintentional increased flow of sensitive technologies to the Soviet Union.

Both the American political party system, as well as the mechanisms of political decision-making within the American Congress may unintentionally combine to produce a structural vulnerability to certain types of narrowly focused, well funded operations designed to influence the outcome of key decisions.

This particular window of opportunity arises from the diffuse nature of Congressional decision-making coupled with weak party discipline and the lack of an enforceable national party platform. While this kind of political analysis may at first seem to take us rather far afield from the Soviet acquisition of U.S. weapons technology, we shall shortly see how this general analysis relates to the specific problem at hand.

One aspect of the weak party system is that in Congress, we have local rather than national party selection of candidates (the latter process being generally characteristic of strong party parliamentary systems). As a result, much of national politics in the United States is, in fact, simply an extended version of local politics. Candidates are selected locally and represent local interests which are normally serviced through the Congressional committee and floor reciprocity system.

In other words, local constituency benefits which do not infringe upon the distribution of, or otherwise interdict the constituency benefits of other districts are subjected to a committee review by the relevant committee or subcommittee, and then typically passed by the House as a whole subsequent to committee approval. The independence of decision variables under the floor reciprocity system is bounded only by overall resource constraints, since fiscal equivalence is weak (constituency benefits are not tied directly to local tax collection) and decision-makers (i.e. Congressmen) are not in direct competition

with one another for office (as they would be under a strong national party system).

From the standpoint of technology transfer, the Soviets' advantage derives from the combination of the general dependency of U.S. high technology goods manufacturers on export markets with the independent compartmentation of Congressional decision-making units. The annual report of the CIA National Foreign Assessment Center, on Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology, makes it abundantly clear that through two state ministry systems, VPK and GKNT, there already exists a highly developed infrastructure dedicated to clandestine high technology acquisitions. At the same time, the underlying legislation which authorizes the Department of Commerce administrative rules pursuant to the Export Administration Act is largely the product of a committee of only forty Congressmen (the House Committee on Science and Technology) all of whom must be responsive to their respective constituencies in the provision of attributable benefits over a very short time horizon.

Among the pressures which the committee has to deal with are highly organized, well financed lobbies which seek to relax the current level of trade restrictions stemming from the Export Administration Act. One recent study on export controls notes that:<sup>1</sup>

...The business community has been much better organized, through the Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Business Roundtable, and various trade associations. If one



were to ask any of these groups to list the number one export problem or issue, they would probably say it was the Export Administration Act. They have all lobbied extensively in both the House and the Senate...

In addition to the above-mentioned group, there are a variety of special-interest manufacturers' groups such as the Electronic Industry Association, which deal in classes of components which possess a special relevance to defense, especially since many of their commercial civilian applications have a potential military or military production dual use.

From the standpoint of the manufacturers, a successful lobbying effort would be one which resulted in a relaxation of the standards and procedures imposed by the Export Administration Act. Such an outcome would be beneficial to Soviet acquisition efforts, regardless of whether or not there had been Soviet operations contributing to the relaxation of E.A.A. standards.

Under the existing controls, the Soviets have been forced into expensive individual operations in order to circumvent the provisions and rules of the EAA. Because these operations are costly and must be conducted on a case by case basis, they function as an overall limiting device on the Soviet acquisition of Western technologies. On the other hand, a general relaxation in the stringency of high technology export rules (particularly with regard to dual-use technologies) would represent a vast benefit to VPK, GKNT and the Soviet defense effort. Under such

conditions, the overall collection effort could be substantially intensified at an aggregate reduction in cost.

The problem here is multiple and complex. On the one hand, manufacturers complain that the current Commerce Department administrative rules (from the EAA) governing the sale of high technology goods are too restrictive. As supporting evidence, they provide a number of examples whereby similar technologies (especially dual use semi-conductor technologies) are being freely traded by European manufacturers to the detriment of the American economy (including erosion of American market share in high technology goods as well as increases in the trade deficit). On the other hand, the current restrictions are sufficiently detailed and comprehensive, that efforts to circumvent them are likely to be difficult and costly.

Naturally then, manufacturers have a strong incentive to seek reform at the more fundamental level of the Export Administration Act itself, rather than engage in continual costly legal action on a case by case basis. The problem with such reform is that not only is it a poor idea on national security grounds, but that the decision mechanism by which such policy would most likely be implemented will be more naturally concerned with the economic issues than with the security issues. Even worse, the small number of decision-makers required to implement such a policy change,<sup>2</sup> opens up a variety of questions regarding the ways in which Congressmen respond to the legitimate demands of their constituents.

If one follows the model of Congressional decision-making elaborated by E. W. Kelley,<sup>3</sup> the picture which emerges is rather straightforward, and in this case, at least potentially alarming. Over the years, particularly as its budgetary scope and responsibilities have vastly expanded, Congress has institutionalized a number of formal and informal time-, money- and labor-saving devices in order to accomplish its decisional agenda. The most enduring structural device is the mechanism of Congressional floor reciprocity, which is occasionally misidentified elsewhere in the literature as "log-rolling".<sup>4</sup> Through this mechanism, bills which pass committee vote (especially highly technical or complex bills) are generally approved by the Congress as a whole. In both the specific case of modifications to the Export Administration Act, and the more general case of East-West trade as a whole, the number of decision-makers who actually engage in a close and self-conscious review of the legislation is quite small. Moreover, in at least some cases they will represent constituencies which obtain direct economic benefits from such legislation, in which case their natural inclination will be to favor a relaxation of controls. Additionally, committee members will presumably be subjected to well-managed and well-financed lobbying campaigns from the beneficiary industries.

All of this would lead in the direction of policy recommendations urging the greatest degree of caution in relaxing export controls for sensitive and even multiple-use technologies.

However, there is an additional, more sinister possibility which bears at least cursory examination. It is clear that the Soviets have devoted enormous resources to the clandestine collection and acquisition of western technology.<sup>5</sup> In this, as in their numerous other areas of clandestine collection and covert operations, the Soviets have made extensive uses of intermediaries. Should the Soviets target the political vulnerabilities of the U.S. export control system, the key target would be the legislative relaxation of the provisions of the Export Administration Act, since this would result in facilitating their acquisition of sensitive technologies across the board.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, given a set of well-disguised intermediaries controlled through an appropriately distant set of relationships, it might be quite difficult to differentiate Soviet-inspired efforts from those of local manufacturers.<sup>7</sup> If such activity were to be undertaken by the KGB (the most likely organization to be tasked for the actual mechanics of the operation), one would expect that their efforts would be tightly focused and aimed at a small number of key Congressional districts. While the author does not intend to suggest that current or past Congressional voting patterns are the result of hostile foreign government interference with the American political process, it is important to note that such vulnerabilities do exist, and should not be ignored when crucial defense-related policies are discussed. Awareness of this structural level of political vulnerability is particularly

**important when the issues involve complex tradeoffs between competing interest groups and the outcome strongly affects other international actors, particularly the U.S.S.R.**

### NOTES

1. "Reconciling Export Opportunities and National Security Policy: Renewal of the Export Administration Act", Don Bonker in Export Controls Ed. Michael Czinkota, Praeger Special Studies (New York 1984), p. 159

2. It should be noted that not all Congressmen on the relevant committees are unaware of the security implications. A number of them, on previous occasions, have expressed strong and knowledgeable concerns about the dangers of uncontrolled East-West technology transfer. The purpose of this article is primarily theoretical in scope, and the author seeks to locate a structural vulnerability in the Congressional decision-making process, which may at some future time be utilized against American national interests.

3. Policy and Politics in the United States, E. W. Kelley, Cornell University Press (New York 1987).

4. I call the "log-rolling" label a misconception for several reasons. First, the physical act of bargaining which is the purported basis of logrolling simply doesn't take place in the vast majority of cases. More importantly, Congressmen don't have the time to engage in a perpetual bargaining game of this type. Finally, log-rolling would not survive as a daily method of transacting ordinary Congressional business, simply because it would not be labor-saving, which is the primary purpose of the floor reciprocity system.

5. The current status of Soviet efforts in this area are published annually in Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology prepared by the National Foreign Assessment Center of the Central Intelligence Agency.

6. "Sensitive technologies" is used here as a shorthand representation of the detailed items, processes and materials (in some cases raw materials, such as the high grade silicon necessary for a variety of advanced semiconductors) enumerated in the report, Soviet Acquisition of Western Tehnology, as high priority acquisition targets.

7. This could involve a number of individuals and/or corporations, which would be dispersed both geographically and financially. This type of sequential transaction is quite common in international trading practice, and is generally referred to as a "daisy chain". Typically, such devices are invoked commercially, much in the same way that "cut-outs" are used in espionage activities, i.e., to obscure the relationship between principal and agent.